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Abstract
This article employs a two-level analysis to compare the discursive performance of gender on social media in Hungary
and Romania; the two countries with the lowest percentage of women in politics in the European Union (EU). First, by
revealing the tension between conservative views about gender roles, and social and political specificities in the two coun-
tries, the research illustrates how various parties on the conservative right ideological continuum―from the center-right
to right-wing populism―relate to the feminist project. Secondly, it analyzes how selected women politicians within this
continuum negotiate their ideological beliefs about gender roles with their political career interests, by means of social
media (Facebook). The analytical constructs of idealized motherhood and feminine toughness are employed to examine a
period of intensive political campaigning in 2014 in both Hungary and Romania. The study triangulates the multi-layered
discursive circumstances (the historical, contextual, and social media contexts) in Hungary and Romania, andmaps out the
similarities and differences that are disclosed when comparing the selected women politicians. The article makes a signif-
icant theoretical and empirical contribution to scholarship on gender and conservatism in particular and raises questions
for the wider study of gender, politics, and social media in general.
Keywords
conservatism; Eastern Europe; Facebook; feminism; gender; ideological continuum; politics; right-wing populism; social
media; women
Issue
This article is part of the issue “The Feminist Project under Threat in Europe”, edited by Mieke Verloo (Radboud University,
The Netherlands) and David Paternotte (Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium).
© 2018 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
This study contributes to the emerging scholarship on
the conservative opposition to, or reinterpretation of,
the feminist project (Celis & Childs, 2011; Celis & Erzeel,
2015; Childs & Webb, 2012; Paternotte & Kuhar, 2017;
Verloo, 2018). It examines how women’s issues and
women’s interests are expressed along a conservative
right continuum, encompassing a trajectory from center-
right parties to right-wing populist parties that subscribe
to a socially conservative political agenda. The article
expands the focus of previous studies on gender and
conservatism, which tend to privilege US- and Western-
centered perspectives―such as the special issue Gender
and Conservatism, edited by Celis and Childs (2018)―by
focusing on Hungary and Romania, which stand out in
the European Union (EU) for having the lowest levels
of women’s political participation in their respective na-
tional parliaments. In 2014, the newly elected Hungar-
ian National Assembly registered 10.1% women mem-
bers of parliament (MPs); in turn, in both Romanian
Houses of Parliament there were approximately 11.5%
womenMPs. It is noteworthy in this context, that among
the fourteen candidates in the 2014 Romanian Presiden-
tial elections, the two women both had conservative
right backgrounds. Neither qualified for the runoff. In
the EU Parliament elections organized the same year,
the percentage of women members from Hungary and
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 3, Pages 43–54 43
Romania elected to as MEPs was somewhat better, al-
beit significantly below the European average: 19% in
Hungary, 28% in Romania. Concerning elections, espe-
cially after Barack Obama’s 2008 Presidential election in
the United States, it was acknowledged that social me-
dia had become a significant platform for political cam-
paigns, particularly Facebook. Unlike traditional media,
Facebook encourages more personalized political per-
formances on behalf of the candidates, and stimulates
engagement between politicians and potential voters.
These developments are not limited to the US and West-
ern Europe (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016; Kalsnes, 2016). In-
deed, campaigning through Facebook has been promptly
embraced by both male and female politicians in East-
ern Europe as well (Băluţă, 2015; Bene, 2017). The ar-
ticle thus answers appeals for studies that contextual-
ize how leading conservative politicians have shaped
the gender equality agenda (Spierings & Zaslove, 2015,
pp. 172–173), providing an Eastern European perspec-
tive, and for additional analyses of the relationship be-
tween politics, gender, and social media (Sandberg &
Öhlberg, 2017, p. 327).
The research questions are: What form(s) does the
conservative opposition to, or reinterpretation of, the
feminist project in Hungary and Romania take? How do
conservative right women politicians in these countries
negotiate their ideological beliefs about gender roles
with their political career interests? In considering these,
the article provides a two-level analysis: first, the con-
servative right continuum is examined in both Hungary
and Romania; secondly, the social media campaigns of
four established women politicians (two from each coun-
try) who are situated along this ideological continuum
are analyzed. The article is organized in six sections. First,
the conceptual basis to the theoretical framework of the
study is articulated. Secondly, the methodology which
underpins the two-level analysis is outlined. Thirdly, the
historical context of the conservative right continuum in
the two countries is critically analyzed. Fourthly, the con-
text of situation is utilized to examine the careers of se-
lected women politicians. Fifthly, the discursive perfor-
mance of gender is analyzed in the social media politi-
cal campaigning of the successive elections in 2014. Fi-
nally, the conclusion suggests ways in which the study
contributes to the field and indicates potential avenues
for further research.
2. Conceptual Articulations
I suggest the concept of conservative right continuum to
describe the ideological space occupied by center-right
parties, often labelled “New Right” in the US and West-
ern Europe, which fuse new conceptions of social con-
servativism with neoliberal economic dogma (Childs &
Webb, 2012, p. 28; Schreiber, 2016, p. 7), as well as right-
wing populist parties, which combine nostalgic welfare
chauvinism with cultural conservatism in nativist cloth-
ing―supposedly defending the native ethnic majority
from harmful, and polluting external influences (Mudde,
2016, p. 4). The common denominator of this ideological
continuum is the constitutive parties’ position towards
the feminist project, emphasizing the “natural” basis of
the heterosexual nuclear family, and not least its biologi-
cal unity (Celis & Childs, 2018; Childs &Webb, 2012; Gib-
son & Heyse, 2010; Paternotte & Kuhar, 2017; Schreiber,
2016; Wodak, 2015). The conservative understanding of
a “traditional family” is often juxtaposed against per-
ceived degeneracy and state dependency in contempo-
rary society (Childs & Webb, 2012, p. 28; Paternotte &
Kuhar, 2017, p. 6), and it is consequently weaponized
against the state’s economic meddling and attempts to
promote gender (and sexual) equality. In other words,
under the neoliberal imperative to “roll back the state”
(Walby, 2015, p. 172), the heterosexual nuclear family
emerges as “the ideal setting to ensure the reproduction
of a disciplined working force, to stimulate and regulate
consumerist identifications, and to provide for childcare
and social security” (Norocel, 2013, p. 163), whereby
women and men are constituted “as different, albeit
complementary, sexes, with accompanying sex specific
gender roles” (Childs & Webb, 2012, p. 9).
2.1. Conservative Conceptions of Women in Politics
Such complementarity between men and women rests
on an inherent gender hierarchy that is “theologically
and/or biologically derived and should be the basis for
women’s pride and social status” (Schreiber, 2016, p. 2).
Consequently, women are accepted in politics insofar as
they embody two overlapping ideals: the elevated ma-
ternal image, cementing the gender hierarchy within the
family unit whereby the acts of childbearing and chil-
drearing are performed; and that of a woman with a
strong professional background, though in this case es-
pousing opposition to feminism is, at least nominally, im-
perative (Gibson & Heyse, 2010, pp. 251–253; Klien &
Farrar, 2009, p. 75; Meret, 2015, pp. 94–97). Mother-
hood, symbolically connected to the cultic image of Vir-
gin Mary (Petö, 2010), is performed in the conservative
context in intimate connection to such values as nurtu-
rance, empathy, and community, which are deemed to
exclusively belong to the “feminine repertoire”; its corre-
sponding masculine ideal of the warrior-hero, the bread-
winning family father, or the rugged pioneer is tacitly en-
dorsed (Gibson & Heyse, 2010, p. 253). Women’s perfor-
mance of their motherhood in politics is accepted pro-
vided they do not seek political power in itself; rather,
they may seek office from compassion, given they bal-
ance work and family responsibilities, and ensure their
“husband’s blessing (and participation in domestic life)”
(Schreiber, 2016, p. 16). Motherhood as one’s defining
political performance is nonetheless confining women
to a position of simple appendages to their family, and
eventually ushers them back into the safety of their fam-
ily homes. This notwithstanding, right-wing populist fe-
male leaders synthetize “the role of woman not only as
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 3, Pages 43–54 44
a mother and wife at home because of her natural repro-
ductive abilities, but also not shaped by ‘radical’ views
on gender and gender equality” (Meret, 2015, p. 96).
Claiming to defend conservative family values, they em-
ploy motherhood instrumentally to position themselves
as nurturing and protecting “their people”, thereby justi-
fying strict and dominant female party leadership (Meret,
2015, p. 101). In this regard, while inherently contradic-
tory, the ideal of professional woman, or feminine tough-
ness, presents itself with a greater potential. The conser-
vative women who adopt it follow a dress-code that ac-
knowledges their ascribed gender difference from their
male fellows with whom they openly compete for polit-
ical power. “However, while they are being praised for
their femininity, they are also touted for being tough
and aggressive” (Schreiber, 2016, p. 8). On the conser-
vative right continuum, these women come to represent
the “truly liberated women”, as opposed to the allegedly
“self-serving and hypocritical” feminists, encapsulating in
one performance both the endeavors “to reinscribe tra-
ditional gender roles”, and the efforts to disrupt the very
roles they supposedly embody; such proclaimed libera-
tion “also serves to cast feminists as being out of touch,
while reinforcing the unfounded stereotype of feminists
as unfeminine” (Schreiber, 2016, pp. 11–12).
2.2. Women, Politics, and Facebook
To enter politics and legitimize their presence in a sphere
traditionally dominated by men, women have “devel-
oped particular patterns of expressions based largely on
the articulation of lived experiences, often moving be-
yond abstract intellect to embrace the concrete, the emo-
tional, the inclusive, and the personal through narrative”
(Klien & Farrar, 2009, p. 66). Facebook proves an excel-
lent additional medium for women politicians to make
use of these discursive patterns. Establishing “oneself as
the spokesperson of an…underrepresented group (such
as women) becomes easier without gatekeepers, and
Facebook, in particular, can facilitate such a strategy” (Ja-
cobs & Spierings, 2016, p. 41). Indeed, Facebook is a
particularly potent social media platform that enables
politicians to present their personal interests, their po-
litical biographies, and craft a closer relationship with
their potential voters, based upon issues which are gen-
erally toned down, or very difficult to achieve through
traditional media (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016, pp. 20–22;
Sandberg & Öhlberg, 2017, pp. 315–316; Savulescu &
Vitelar, 2012, pp. 10–11). This is enabled by the inherent
nature of communication on Facebook (i.e., posting vari-
ous updates on the personal profile, liking, or comment-
ing on other people’s posts), which emphasizes agency
and self-representation. Put another way, Facebook sup-
ports the “reification of self though public performance”;
it enables the re-presentation of specific aspects of one’s
identity―here gender roles and other normative influ-
ences are very important―, which are deemed desir-
able and incarnate “an idea of who one wants to be, in-
cluding incipient aspects of personal identity that users
want to cultivate”, and which otherwise “might be inhib-
ited in the off-line world” (Manago, Graham, Greenfield,
& Salimkhan, 2008, pp. 450–452). The feedback from
other Facebook users serves as a kind of “social verifi-
cation”, and bestows the identity performance with “so-
cial legitimacy”. This posits a serious challenge for politi-
cians, since there is an “inherent tension between the
expectation for professionalism, and the need to craft
a more personalized and intimate display, aiming for a
quasi-total transparency, in the politician’s performative
on their social media profiles” (Savulescu & Vitelar, 2012,
pp. 17–18).
2.3. Facebook Use by Conservative Women
The present study aims to connect these two research
areas, and contribute to the emerging field of gender,
politics, and social media. Theoretically, the article aims
to map out how the tensions between ideological con-
straints about gender roles specific to the conservative
right continuum, and women’s empowerment in politics,
are ironed out by means of social media, which enables
conservativewomen to pursue their political career inter-
ests while reinterpreting or opposing outright the femi-
nist project. Empirically, it draws on evidence from both
the East European historical context (the specificities of
Hungarian and Romanian politics concerning women),
whilst also providing a snapshot of the situational con-
text (women’s participation in the 2014 long election
year) inwhich fourwomenwith a political backgroundon
the conservative right continuum perform unmediated
and “truer” selves on Facebook.
3. Methodological Notes
I make use of a modified set of tools inspired by the
Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) (Reisigl & Wodak,
2009; Wodak, 2015; Wodak & Meyer, 2009), to discern
in the collected empirics discursive performances of gen-
der (Butler, 1993). DHA entails a retroductable investiga-
tion (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 3): since no hypotheses
are formulated/tested in the study, the analysis must be
transparent, the interpretations justified, and the value
positions made explicit. Discourse in this respect is un-
derstood as a “cluster of context-dependent semiotic
practices” that are in equal measure “socially consti-
tuted and socially constitutive”, and “related to a macro-
topic”, although discourse is “not a closed unit, but a
dynamic semiotic entity that is open to reinterpretation
and continuation” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 89). The
DHA aims to analyze “texts―be they audio, spoken, vi-
sual and/or written―as they relate to structured knowl-
edge (discourses), [which] must be viewed in terms of
their situatedness” (Wodak, 2015, p. 51, italics in origi-
nal). The DHA follows the principle of triangulation that
positions the analyzed discourse in a multi-layered con-
text, which first sheds light on the “broader sociopo-
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litical and historical context” that the discourse is em-
bedded in, and then accounts for the “extralinguistic so-
cial variables and institutional frames” of the specific
“context of situation”, in which the empirical material
was collected (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 93). Using pri-
mary (party manifestoes, policy proposals, etc.) and sec-
ondary sources, the first two stages of triangulation are
explicit in the Eastern European specificity, thus position-
ing this study in the wider framework of analyses of con-
servatism and gender.
Use is also made of discursive performances of gen-
der, whereby performativity is “the reiterative and ci-
tational practice by which discourse produces the ef-
fects it names” (Butler, 1993, p. 2). These citational prac-
tices may be either compliant with, or disruptive of the
heterosexual norm, revealing that gender, in the con-
text of discourse, “is constructed through relations of
power and, specifically, normative constraints that not
only produce but regulate various bodily beings” (But-
ler, 1993, p. x). With reference to the matter at hand,
the discursive performance of gender is employed to an-
alyze Facebook posts, thereby exposing the reiterative
and citational practices, which on social media produce
the gendered identity of women politicians on the con-
servative right continuum within the ideologically sanc-
tioned boundaries thereof. Put simply, and aware that
Facebook allows account-owners to later modify, even
delete their posts or accompanying comments, I argue
that what these women politicians have left after such
a politically intense year as 2014, documents how suc-
cessive posts produced their discursive performance of
gender, and that these practices are embedded in the
wider historical context of discourse that DHA triangula-
tion unveils.
The selected women politicians are Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz
and Dóra Dúró in Hungary, and Elena Udrea and Monica
Macovei in Romania, respectively. They represent vari-
ous forces along the conservative right continuum: from
center-right parties (PMP, M10), to radicalized center-
right parties (FIDESZ), and right-wing populist parties
(JOBBIK) (see Table 1). In addition, they occupy powerful
positions both in their own parties, and in national (Dúró,
Udrea), or European politics (Gáll-Pelcz, Macovei).
The chosen timeframe stretched from January 1 to
December 31, 2014, and the empirical material gath-
ered illustrated several fields of political action (Reisigl &
Wodak, 2009, p. 91): national and European elections, as
well as day-to-day activities aimed at consolidating public
attitudes towards the party’s political agenda. These ob-
servations needed to be corroboratedwith previous find-
ings in the field, which indicated that such a timeframe
accounted for the different opportunities that Facebook
provides: intensive scrutiny by traditional media, supple-
mented by the candidates’ social media presence dur-
ing national elections; the candidates’ efforts to profile
themselves in so-called second order elections such as
those for the EU Parliament, which generally yields less
attention from the traditional media; and the long-term
construction of a distinctive political profile (Jacobs &
Spierings, 2016, pp. 38–39). Following the ethical guide-
lines for Internet research (Association of Internet Re-
searchers, 2002, 2012), the web application Facebook
loader (University of Oslo, 2013) was used to extract the
posts and comments from their public Facebook pages1,
and to study various types of interaction, such as Likes,
Shares, and Comments (Kalsnes, 2016, pp. 3–4).
First, a total of 1998 posts were collected; the over-
whelming majority belonging to the Romanian politi-
cians (see Table 1). A possible explanation for this may
be that the two Romanian politicians participated in cam-
paigning for both the EU Parliament elections, as well as
subsequent Presidential elections. Macovei’s posts are
twice as numerous as Udrea’s, but this may be a re-
sult of Macovei running as an independent presidential
candidate, and thus more reliant on social media than
traditional media for reaching out to potential support-
ers. Similarly, Gáll-Pelcz’s reduced presence may be ex-
plained by the significant campaign that FIDESZ pushed
through conventional channels for all candidates.
Second, the collected posts were systematized the-
matically: experiences of maternity and family issues
(motherhood), and those concerning the challenges
of women’s engagement in politics (feminine tough-
ness)―see Table 1. These posts were scattered during
the entire selected period and received a varied amount
of attention. For example, Gáll-Pelcz gathered at most
Table 1. Facebook activity of selected women politicians.
Politicians Party Facebook profile Total posts Total thematic
in 2014 posts
Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz FIDESZ https://www.facebook.com/ildiko.pelcz.gall/ 166 18
Dóra Dúró JOBBIK https://www.facebook.com/durodora/ 205 57
Elena Udrea PDL/PMP https://www.facebook.com/EUdrea/ 506 96
Monica Macovei PDL/M10 https://www.facebook.com/MonicaMacoveiUE/ 1121 85
1 This was undertaken in April-May 2016, and cross-checked in April 2017, to ensure that the analyzed posts have not been altered/deleted in the
meanwhile.
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1239 likes (with a maximum of 1456 likes for a post that
year); Dúró received 4062 likes (the most likes for any
of her posts in 2014); Udrea had 15923 likes (with max-
imum 26817 likes for a post in 2014); while Macovei re-
ceived 16871 likes (withmaximum 19720 likes). This indi-
cates that the posts fulfilling these criteria received the
same amount of attention as other posts, therefore play-
ing an important role in contouring the political self that
these women perform on Facebook.
4. The Historical Context
In Hungary, the political parties on the conservative right
continuum share an opposition to feminism, and place a
strong emphasis on normative heterosexuality, particu-
larly the “cult of motherhood” (Félix, 2017; Petö, 2010;
Szikra, 2014). In the conservative discourses, the demo-
graphic problems faced by Hungary are attributed to the
previous “austerity regime of the left-liberal camp―plus
the pervasiveness of liberalism in individualism and per-
sonal freedom. Therefore, the political elements of lib-
eralization appear to threaten the family as much as
the economic ones, while the politics of gender and re-
production reconstitute political camps” (Korkut, 2012,
p. 175). As such, politics concerning women’s rights are
assimilated to “family politics, which covers the social
role of women by models offered by the cult of [Vir-
gin] Mary”, which implicitly posits women’s choice to
withstand motherhood as “‘national’ sabotage” (Petö,
2010, p. 196).
Of great significance to the political context, was the
ideological transition of the Alliance of Young Democrats-
Hungarian Civic Alliance (FIDESZ), from a previously
liberal anti-Communist stance, to one locating itself
firmly on the conservative right continuum (Egedy, 2009,
pp. 47–48; Korkut, 2012, p. 19; Montgomery, 2015,
p. 230). It is argued that while FIDESZ “share elements
with other populist and/or right-wing parties in the [re-
gion], it follows a multifarious conservative ideology”
(Korkut, 2012, p. 168), based on “exclusionary national
identity and populism” (Montgomery, 2015, p. 228), in
the sense that the party underwent an “adjustment
of self-identity…that in time accommodated Christian-
ity, moral revolution, entrepreneurship, and finally fam-
ily” (Korkut, 2012, p. 165). FIDESZ consolidated its posi-
tion as the major conservative right political force, defin-
ing itself not only “as the guardian and agent of order
and moral progressions”, but also looking upon “itself
as the protector and rescuer of Hungarian society, ful-
filling its mission in harmony with the moral demands
of the cosmic world order” (Egedy, 2009, p. 49). Tak-
ing advantage of the political implosion of the center-
left, FIDESZ continued its collaborationwith the Christian
Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) and cemented its grip
onto power in the 2014 Hungarian Parliament elections
(see Table 2). The two parties had won the previous elec-
tions with a two thirds majority, which allowed them to
draft and adopt a new constitution without much oppo-
sition (Montgomery, 2015, p. 231). Importantly, the new
Hungarian Constitution (2011) narrowly defines the fam-
ily to be based on “the marriage between a man and a
woman”, thereby refusing the same legal rights to same-
sex couples and discriminating against “thousands of het-
erosexual cohabiting couples and their children” (Szikra,
2014, p. 494). The main campaign message in the 2014
EU Parliament elections the same year centered on iden-
tity issues, delimiting the “us” (Hungarians) from “Brus-
sels” (a colloquial term, referring to the EU institutions,
and the set of norms and values FIDESZ intended to pro-
tect Hungarians frombeing forced to adopt); in this strug-
gle, the center-left opposition were swiftly depicted as
mere “incompetent actors” (Koller, 2017, p. 174). Such
vocal opposition against the EU is surprising, given that
in the EU Parliament FIDESZ is affiliated to the European
People’s Party (EPP), the largest political force that gath-
ers Christian Democratic and other conservative parties
with a nominally center-right political perspective, and
that Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz is among the Parliament’s acting
Vice-Presidents.
The other political force on the conservative right
continuum of interest here is the right-wing populist
Movement for a Better Hungary (JOBBIK). Although in a
position of relative ideological proximity to FIDESZ, JOB-
BIK espouses a type of social conservatism wrapped ag-
gressively in ethnic-based nativism,which proclaims “the
homogeneous people as ‘national-minded ethnic Hun-
garians’, a category that assumes Christianity and ex-
cludes a large range of other groups, including Roma,
Jews, Communists and ex-Communists, urbanist intellec-
tuals and journalists, feminists, homosexuals and politi-
cians who espouse pro-EU, pro-mondialist or neoliberal
views” (Montgomery, 2015, p. 233). Different in tone
rather than focus from FIDESZ, JOBBIK declare their con-
cern about the demographic crisis Hungary is facing;
their solution is to indicate the mothering of ethnically
pure Hungarian offspring as “women’s primary citizen-
Table 2. Elections in Hungary (2010–2014).
National Parliamentary elections, in % (and MPs) EU Parliament elections in % (and MEPs)
Party
Year 2010 (386) 2014 (only 199) 2014 (21)
FIDESZ + KDNP 52.7 (227 + 26) 44.9 (117 + 16) 51.5 (11 + 1)
JOBBIK 16.7 (21) 20.2 (23) 14.7 (3)
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ship value” (Montgomery, 2015, p. 233). This is to be
achieved through a combination of measures, from a to-
tal ban on abortions, strengthening the role of family and
encouraging “responsibly conceived children” among
the ethnic Hungarians, to discouraging the perceived ex-
cessive nativity of Roma minority, or what JOBBIK dis-
paragingly labelled “Gypsy breeding (cigánytenyészet)
maintained by state funds” (Korkut, 2012, p. 190). In
the EU Parliament JOBBIK were deemed too extreme by
other right-wing populist parties; their three MEPs are
among the Non-Attached Members.
In Romania, support for women’s access to politics
andwomen’s issues has generally been fluid, conjectural,
and punctual, rather than programmatic, and played out
against a backdrop of tacit misogyny masquerading as
an emphasis on traditional family values (Băluţă, 2015;
Miroiu, 2015). The conservative discourses mix such ar-
guments as “being European”, or “adhering to European
values” with appeals to enrich politics with “feminine
beauty”, and sometimes even resort to religion to le-
gitimize women’s participation in politics―as God cre-
ated both men and women. This notwithstanding, fem-
inism and the non-traditional and emancipatory ideals
it promotes have been strongly rejected as antinational
and outright unnatural (Norocel, 2016, p. 250), women
have generally been relegated to a narrowly functional-
ist role, selflessly sacrificing themselves for the wellbe-
ing of others, both as mothers and wives at home, and
as colleagues at work. In addition, like in the US and the
rest of Europe (Paternotte & Kuhar, 2017), some vocif-
erous pro-life movements have emerged, with shifting
political anchorage and close ties to religious conserva-
tive groups, and whose existence reflects the fading pub-
lic memory about the draconic anti-abortion laws during
the Ceauşescu dictatorship (Miroiu, 2015, p. 99).
The conservative right continuum in Romania ismore
fragmented, and more dynamic, than in Hungary (Cin-
poeş, 2015, p. 113). There are however certain conser-
vative parties that have shaped Romanian politics (see
Table 3). Much like FIDESZ in Hungary, the Democratic
Liberal Party (PDL), had a sinuous ideological develop-
ment under the guardianship of Traian Băsescu, espe-
cially during his two consecutive presidential mandates
(2004–2014). Founded in 2008 through the merger of
center-left with center-right parties, PDL eventually con-
solidated their position as the main conservative right
political force. Although acknowledging the persistent in-
equalities between women and men in Romania, PDL
actively opposed feminism. Often described derogato-
rily as the “feminist-Marxist amalgam” that encourages
a “contraceptive ethos”, PDL argued that women’s pri-
mary duty when entering politics is to represent the in-
terest of women and mothers that are resisting these
challenges (Iancu, 2012, pp. 159–160). During its time
in government between 2008 and 2012, PDL translated
the previous discursive polarization, one that centered
on the topic of Communist legacy, into one that chal-
lenged the future of welfare services. This shift led to
the effective marginalization, demonization, and dele-
gitimization of entire social segments, particularly the
pauper Roma minority (Cinpoeş, 2015, p. 114). The aus-
terity measures in the aftermath of 2008 financial cri-
sis were clearly gendered. The salary cuts disproportion-
ately affected feminized sectors―education, healthcare,
and public administration―while the burden of rolling
back the already insufficient welfare services was implic-
itly assumed to be borne by women within the family
(Iancu, 2012, p. 160). In the wake of the 2014 EU parlia-
ment elections, and as Băsescu was concluding his last
presidential mandate, PDL entered a period of turmoil
and crafted a political alliance with their previous op-
ponents, the National Liberal Party (PNL). In July that
year, the two parties announced their merger under the
name PNL, although decided to maintain PDL’s conser-
vative right affiliation to EPP in the EU Parliament. In
the 2014 Presidential elections, they jointly supported
Klaus Johannis, whose campaign centered on an intoler-
ance to corruption and a strongly anti-welfare discourse.
This enabled him to insinuate pervasive corruption to
his center-left competitor, and reject most notions of so-
cial equality and justice that underpinned the welfare
system (Cinpoeş, 2015, pp. 109–111). Qualifying for the
runoff, Johannis’ anti-corruption and conservative plat-
form resonated with most candidates on the conserva-
Table 3. Elections in Romania (2012–2016).
National Parliamentary elections, Presidential elections, EU Parliament elections
in % (and MPs), both Chambers Candidate (%, first round) in % (and MEPs)
Party
Year 2012 (588) 2016 (466) 2014 2014 (32)
PNL 58.6a (150) 20.4c (99) Klaus Johannisd (30.4) 15 (6)
PDL 16.5b (74) 12.2 (5-1e)
PMP — 5.7 (26) Elena Udrea (5.2) 6.2 (2)
M10 — — Monica Macovei (4.4) (1e)
Notes: a %USL electoral alliance; b %ARD electoral alliance; c PNL and PDL merged as PNL; d qualified to, and won, the runoff; e Macovei
left PDL―independent MEP.
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tive right continuum and was eventually endorsed for-
mally by their majority.
The People’s Movement Party (PMP) are a splinter
fromPDL, that arosewhen the faction supported by then-
President Băsescu, lost the internal elections and opted
to form a new party in early 2014. Under the leader-
ship of Elena Udrea, and despite open support from Băs-
escu, PMP hovered at around 5% in the elections. The
two MEPs that PMP secured in the EU Parliament elec-
tions joined EPP as well. PMP supported Udrea as a can-
didate in the presidential elections that year. M10 are an-
other, even smaller splinter from PDL, gathered around
Monica Macovei who left PDL after having renewed her
MEP mandate on their list; she later contested the Pres-
idential elections as an independent candidate. Ideolog-
ically, both these parties embrace various strains of con-
servatism. It is worth noting, however, that all Romanian
parties on the conservative right continuum are to vary-
ing degrees positive about the European project, which
tends to be discursively internalized to bolster their anti-
Communist and neoliberal anti-welfare credentials.
5. The Context of Situation
The context of situation is represented by the in-
tense political activity during several electoral campaigns
throughout 2014: the Hungarian Parliament elections
(April 6); the EU Parliament elections (May 25, in both
countries); and the first round of the Romanian Presi-
dential elections (November 2). For the elections taking
place in 2014, it seems that social media, particularly
Facebook, became an important addition to traditional
campaigning in both countries. The Facebook platform
enabled politicians to adopt a more colloquial style, and
switch the focus onto consolidating their relationship
with supporters by exploiting the superficial presenta-
tion of political issues as perceptibly non-political, emo-
tional and familiar topics (Bene, 2017, p. 526; Tasenţe,
2015, p. 93). A few explanations about the networking in-
frastructure in each country are necessary here. In 2014,
some 76.1% of the population in Hungary (Internet Live
Stats, 2016a) had access to Internet, while 54.1% were
connected in Romania (Internet Live Stats, 2016b). Con-
cerning social media usage that year, some 38.89% in
Hungary (Statista, 2017a), respectively 24.24% of the to-
tal population in Romania (Statista, 2017b) had a Face-
book profile.
5.1. Conservative Women in Hungarian Politics
Despite holding prominent positions, the political activi-
ties of Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz and Dóra Dúró have been hardly
researched (Hajdú, 2014; Róna, 2016). Gáll-Pelcz (née
Gáll, born 1962) has considerable political experience,
gleaned from holding various high-profile positions both
nationally and at EU level. She is married, with three chil-
dren. In 2003 Gáll-Pelcz joined FIDESZ, apparently hand-
picked by its chair Viktor Orbán, and quickly climbed
the internal hierarchy becoming vice-chair in 2005. In
the 2006 Hungarian Parliament elections, she won her
first MP mandate; towards the end of the mandate she
served as Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly. In
the 2010 elections, she had her seat confirmed in the
National Assembly, but soon thereafter she replaced
Pál Schmitt as MEP in Brussels, joining EPP. Gáll-Pelcz
chaired FIDESZ women’s chapter (2004–2014). Indeed,
her political profile is centered on women’s and family
issues, oftentimes speaking at conferences dedicated to
women’s issues. She campaigned in 2014 for new pol-
icy measures on childcare aimed at supporting parents
wishing to join the labor market. In the 2014 EU Parlia-
ment elections, she renewed herMEPmandate, andwas
elected one of the EU Parliament’s Vice-Presidents.
Notwithstanding her young age, Dúró (born 1987)
also has a depth of political experience. She started her
political career in 2006 by joining JOBBIK. She was first
elected MP in 2010 as the youngest member of the Na-
tional Assembly, one of only three women JOBBIK MPs
(Hajdú, 2014, p. 67). She was re-elected in the 2014
Hungarian Parliament elections and chaired the Stand-
ing Committee on Culture (2014–2018), which deals
with matters of culture, education, and media. She was
also member of the subcommittee on Women’s Dig-
nity (2015–2018). The party was present in all aspects
of her life, having married former JOBBIK deputy-chair
Előd Novák with whom she has three children. Dúró de-
clared her motto to be “In the womb lives the nation!”
(Neményi, 2015).
5.2. Conservative Women in Romanian Politics
Reflecting on Elena Udrea’s and Monica Macovei’s rise
to political prominence reveals several studies analyzing
their political activity, either individually or in the wider
political context (Băluţă, 2015; Branea, 2017; Miroiu,
2015; Savulescu & Vitelar, 2012). Both Udrea and Ma-
covei were initially connected to PDL and benefited at
various stages in their political careers from the support
of then-President Băsescu. Udrea (born 1973) is often
described as a negative example for how women suc-
ceed in politics―her political career being the result of
an alleged intimate relationship with Băsescu (Norocel,
2016, p. 259). She entered politics in 2004, having been
elected in the Bucharest city council on a PNL ticket,
but in early 2006 she followed Băsescu to the precursor
of conservative PDL, becoming vice-chair shortly there-
after. She won two consecutive MP mandates in 2008
and 2012. She held the portfolio of Tourism, and then
that of Regional Development and Tourism (2008–2012).
In 2014, Udrea joined Băsescu’s PDL breakup wing, and
was elected chair of the newly founded PMP. She partic-
ipated actively in the EU Parliament elections, and later
that year was the PMP presidential candidate. In the first
round of Presidential elections, Udrea came in fourth
with 5.2% (see Table 3); in the runoff she announced her
support for the conservative candidate Johannis (Miroiu,
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2015, p. 101). Udrea divorced her husband in 2013 and
has no children. She used her good-looks to consolidate
a political profile often courting controversy, not only
appearing in a rubber dress and thigh-high boots on
the cover of a women’s glossy magazine, or parachute-
jumping in the eve of the EU Parliament elections, but
also using sexual innuendo in her various campaign slo-
gans (Miroiu, 2015, p. 100).
Macovei (born 1959) is perhaps one of the best-
known politicians outside Romania. She entered poli-
tics in 2004, appointed by then-President Băsescu at the
helm of Ministry of Justice (2004–2007). Macovei pro-
filed herself as a champion of the rule of law and po-
sitioned herself at the frontline of anti-corruption, win-
ning international praise for doing so. She joined PDL
in 2009 and won a MEP mandate in the EU Parliament
elections that year. At EU level, Macovei juxtaposed her
fervent anti-Communism, which consolidated her politi-
cal profile in Romania, against socialist appeals for rap-
prochement with the Russian Federation, which she was
vehemently opposed to. In the 2014 EU Parliament elec-
tions, Macovei was one of the few women candidates to
run a negative campaign against her center-left counter-
candidates (Branea, 2017, p. 139), equating a vote for the
Romanian Social-Democratswith a vote for a pro-Russian
President of the European Commission, thus “against the
country’s own interests”. Having won another mandate,
Macovei left PDL and EPP, to found her own party M10.
She later allied M10 with the group of European Conser-
vatives and Reformists (ECR), which unites conservative
and Eurosceptic parties, such as the Conservative and
Unionist Party (UK), and right-wing populist parties, such
as the (True) Finns Party (Finland). Despite her MEPman-
date,Macovei ran in the 2014 Presidential elections as an
independent candidate on a conservative platform that
was “unfriendly to equal opportunities, and [with] a clear
preference for the rule of law but not for social justice”
(Miroiu, 2015, p. 100). Although lacking a party machine
to support her, Macovei came in fifth with 4.4% of the
votes (see Table 3). Faithful to her conservative agenda,
she too encouraged her supporters to vote for Johannis
in the runoff. Macovei is divorced and has one son.
6. Discursive Performances of Gender on Facebook
The discursive performances of gender centered on ide-
alized motherhood are most clearly articulated in Dúró’s
posts, which define her politically, and blur the distinc-
tion between private and public. This echoes similar
trends with instances of right-wing populism elsewhere
in Europe (Meret, 2015). Even when motherhood itself
is not central, there are numerous references to the im-
portance of the traditional family, and women’s role in
preserving its values and passing them on to future gen-
erations. For instance, discussing the challenges of hav-
ing three young children, Dúró mentions that, besides
the grandparents actively caretaking for their grandchil-
dren, her daughter Hunóra has precociously showed in-
terest in nurturing her younger siblings (post with 1200
Likes, 20 Shares and 55 Comments2). In another post,
Dúró reacts vehemently to the 2014 Eurovision winner
Conchita Wurst, proclaiming the timeliness for JOBBIK’s
social policies aimed at consolidating the “family-based
social organization, and nurturing national traditions”
(post with 470 Likes; 80 Shares; 25 Comments3). Signif-
icantly more restrained, as evinced by the limited num-
ber of posts, Gáll-Pelcz confirms her conservative creden-
tials as a good mother and wife, celebrating her wed-
ding anniversary in the company of her husband and
their daughters (post with 750 Likes; 20 Shares; 60 Com-
ments4). She echoes FIDESZ’s demographic preoccupa-
tions, by talking appreciatively about a woman’s mother-
ing of numerous offspring, concluding in religious tones
that motherhood is a godly blessing (post with 371 Likes;
6 Shares; 10 Comments5). Having no children, Udrea
is the most subdued amongst the analyzed politicians
with references to motherhood. In turn, she takes pic-
tures with children (post with 4500 Likes; and 105 Com-
ments6), and discusses the importance of traditions and
moral values, arguing that the traditional family is “the
pillar of Romanian society” (post with 2080 Likes; 150
Shares; and 78 Comments7). Motherhood does not take
center stage in Macovei’s discursive performance of gen-
der either, though shementions “the trinity of Romanian
nation, Orthodox religion and morality, and traditional
family.” Unlike Dúró, she maintains a certain separation
between private and public life: references to her be-
ing a mother are very rare and mostly indirect (4 posts
during the analyzed period), such as posting the birth-
day greetings received from her son (post with 16870
Likes; 502 Shares; 450 Comments8). Attempting a more
personal approach, however, Macovei focuses on her re-
lationship with her cat, Dubi (post with 3540 Likes; 135
Shares; 175 Comments9).
When it comes to the discursive performances of gen-
der that detail the ideal of feminine toughness, the sit-
uation is somewhat different. Macovei’s posts contour
most clearly with this ideal, and are in stark contrast
to Dúró’s extensive performance of motherhood. Inter-
estingly, Macovei rarely mentions being a woman, or a
mother herself; instead, she performs an almost gender-
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fighting singlehandedly and stubbornly against corrup-
tion (post with 5700 Likes; 700 Shares; 290 Comments10).
Nonetheless, Macovei dismisses the pervasive misogyny
in Romanian society. She uses a conservative way of
reasoning, arguing that since women acquire extensive
management skills by maintaining their family house-
holds, they may use these skills when engaging in poli-
tics (post with 1439 Likes; 156 Shares; 298 Comments11).
She positions herself as the “mother of National Anti-
Corruption Directorate (DNA)”, which suggests a substi-
tute for her biological motherhood (post with 240 Likes;
50 Shares; 5 Comments12), or encourages comparisons
between herself and German Chancellor Angela Merkel,
on the account that they both embody good professional
women, with a strong character and will, but also capa-
ble of (feminine) warmth. Gáll-Pelcz, on the other hand,
contours the ideal of a professional woman with a pro-
found knowledge and engagement in women’s issues,
understood in a conservative key to pertain to balanc-
ing between family life, and some sort of participation on
the labor market (post with 324 Likes; 34 Shares; 7 Com-
ments13). Intriguingly, Udrea’s discursive performance
of gender appropriates the ideal of feminine toughness
by fusing conservative discourse―women as social glue,
maintaining the traditional family, and Romanian values
and spirituality―with feminist stances against women’s
discrimination (postwith 6300 Likes; 340 Shares; and 460
Likes14); positive examples of women fighting traditional-
ism―such as Nobel laureateMalala Yousafzai, and social-
ist politicianDilmaRousseff; and glimpses of her ownper-
sonal life. Unlike Macovei, Udrea emphasizes her physi-
cal attributes, skillfully using to her advantage the slan-
derous insinuations of her being Băsescu’s lover. This
is candidly illustrated by comments on one of her pho-
tos that the awkward position she was in was due to
her arranging her bra (post with 2750 Likes; 180 Shares;
and 270 Comments15). In general, Udrea argues in her
posts that beauty, modernity, and youthfulness are the
paramount values for PMP and her presidential cam-
paign, which had the motto “For a beautiful Romania!”
(post with 3730 Likes; 450 Shares; and 775 Comments16).
7. Conclusions
Whilst Hungary and Romania have the lowest levels of
women’s political participation in the EU, and parties
on the conservative right ideological continuum relate
somewhat differently to the feminist project, the anal-
ysis of them is significant to the extant scholarship on
gender and conservatism. For example, in Hungary, both
FIDESZ and JOBBIK position themselves against the femi-
nist project. In a context of strong demographic anxieties,
they fuse social conservatism with exclusionary national-
ism in ways that cement traditional gender roles and em-
phasize normative heterosexuality. In Romania, in turn,
PMP and M10 are more ambiguous, blending outright
opposition to the feminist project with instrumental ef-
forts to reinterpret traditional gender roles that emanate
from neoliberal anti-welfare attitudes.
Corroborating these with the discursive perfor-
mances of gender (summarized in Table 4), and the sig-
nificant gap in the level of visibility between the women
politicians in Hungary and in Romania, three key conclu-
sions are discerned. First, the predominance of mother-
hood performances fortifies the political profiles of Gáll-
Pelcz andDúró as committed representatives of what are
generally regarded as feminine “soft issues” in the mas-
culine “hard” political competition. To varying degrees,
both Hungarian politiciansmerely reiterate the conserva-
tive ideological expectations about women’s traditional
gender roles, even on social media (Celis & Childs, 2018;
Childs & Webb, 2012; Gibson & Heyse, 2010). How-
ever, they do this in quite different ways. Dúró for ex-
ample, uses her motherhood instrumentally to achieve
greater political visibility, whilst Macovei and Udrea at-
tempt to widen their repertoire of discursive perfor-
mances of gender. They for instance, navigate between
women’s traditional gender roles that emphasize famil-
ial and maternal instincts, and those that stress femi-
nine toughness (Schreiber, 2016), albeit with only spo-
radic and contradictory attempts to recast women’s po-
sition as a tolerated presence in the political arena. In a
few instances, there were other performances of gender,
such as the almost gender-blind neoliberal professional,
which appears to be the most extreme interpretation of
“true liberation”.
Secondly, the most clearly antifeminist conceptions
on the conservative right continuum, those that are un-
derpinned by traditional family values, are espoused by
the right-wing populist parties. In this case, women politi-
cians employ various iterations of the motherhood ideal,
but as Dúró exemplifies, this may be used instrumentally
to construct a political career. In other words, it is not
only the different cultural contexts in Hungary and Roma-
nia that enable specific discursive performances of gen-
der, but also the ideological context into which these
women embed their political activity in these countries.
On the other hand, women’s “true liberation” builds on
the ideal of feminine toughness, but in extremis it dis-
misses feminist contestations about women’s underrep-
resentation in politics by simply erasing their gender.
However, selecting four women politicians, and analyzing
their official Facebook profiles in 2014, the article offers a
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Table 4. Facebook posts―Summary of analysis.
Politicians
Performance of gender Motherhood Feminine toughness
Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz Well-contoured Contoured on women’s issues
Dóra Dúró Strong contours Subdued
Elena Udrea Subdued substitute Well-contoured, though contradictory
Monica Macovei Subdued Strong contours
Thirdly, the combination of DHA and social media
analysis sheds light on the way Facebook bridges the di-
visions between the ideological constraints about gen-
der roles specific to the conservative right continuum,
and to women’s empowerment in politics. Further re-
search could explore comparatively and, in more detail,
how these conservative ideals (Gibson & Heyse, 2010;
Schreiber, 2016) are faithfully performed, resisted, con-
tested, or even replaced by women politicians (Celis &
Childs, 2018; Celis & Erzeel, 2015; Childs & Webb, 2012).
Further, and arguably more significant, is the new re-
search opportunities social media allows, and how the
discursive performances of gender articulate resistance
to, or offer a reinterpretation of, the feminist project.
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